The Biometric Society |
| The Biometric Society is a fictive future trend of the Information Society in which our daily life is dominated by biometric identification using a central data base. This has a lot of benefits for the users but at the same time enables a nearly total surveillance. Already today one can observe permanently advancing surveillance using data which are a by-product of state-of-the-art technologies and services. This kind of surveillance can effectively be used as a measure against terrorism, although it is also suspected to favor democide. Possibly, since there is no proven stringency that total surveillance is incompatible with democracy, there is little resistance against it. |
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| Foreword of the author. This presentation was held on September 3rd, 2006, at a NATO sponsored Advanced Research Workshop in Jerusalem, see program. It is based on an investigation which was dedicated to the question "How dangerous is biometrics really?". As each new privacy-concerning technology, biometrics is suspected to be a considerable danger to our freedom and thus is antagonized as a matter of principle by many groups which defend human rights. Here I was in a predicament: On the one hand I actively support biometrics research and dissemination of this technology and on the other hand I feel devoted to said groups which fight against the corruption of liberal values. How does this match? To approach the problem, I created a model called the Biometric Society to try to simulate the worst case situation and to get a deeper understanding what the real risks of biometrics could be. Especially, I wanted to avoid that argumentation remains based on general principles without trying to get to the bottom. Each new technology needs a thorough investigation and discussion of all its pitfalls, before the first damage is to be complained. Only this enables precautionary measures at an early time. The question, whether the Biometric Society, as it will be defined, will ever become reality or even when this will happen, was not in the scope of the present investigation. |
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Since all these advances will drastically change our life, the term "Information Society" has been created [1]. The impact of the Information Society on legal framework and privacy will be enormous. But many of us do not really perceive this because the change is a creeping process which often uses outstanding occurrences as justification. We are amid this process which yields a degeneration of liberal values, establishing as information surveillance, data retention, and censorship, while taking back banking secret and other rights. The question "Is this really a degeneration or is it a necessity for our survival?" disunites many people - and will not be answered in this presentation.
Since I am working in the field of biometrics, it was exciting for me to draw a vision called "The Biometric Society" [2] which I presented at the 5th meeting of the Biometric Identification Technology Ethics group which was dedicated to the topic "Future Technologies". The actual presentation is an extract with special extensions on security.
Today, it is possible for one fingerprint to separate more than 1 Million people while facial geometry as feature has its limit for less than 1000 people. As a consequence and in contrast to fears of many data protection commissioners, surveillance systems with face recognition are (and possibly will ever stay to be) poor candidates for Big Brother scenarios! On the other hand, using more than one finger possibly allows to separate the whole mankind.
Unfortunately, it is just the property of uniqueness of an identifier which is also susceptible to misuse. For that reason, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany has forbidden to use personal identifiers for the registration of all German citizens in 1983.
Security generally is loosely defined as absence of risk or danger to a value. To understand what security really is, I prefer a simple three-part model, comprising
For example, the value may be jewels, the protection a safe, and the danger a thief who tries to steel the jewels. The same model works when human life is threatened by an attacker. In this scenery we have a lot of appropriate protection means: police, surveillance, flight passenger checks, etc. The type of protection varies with changing values. For example, if not a single person is threatened but a whole nation, the police is to be replaced by a defense army.
Security = 1 - Risk
Risk is technically defined as the product of two probabilities: the incidence rate for a damage and the extent of loss. As a result, security may be regarded as a probability, too. To quantify a probability practically, this cannot be done on the basis of a single event. Rather, a large quantity of incidents is needed!
My proposal is that a value needs as much security that its mean natural lifetime is not significantly reduced by artificial damages.
For a human being the lifetime is about 100 years. Then the mean natural risk to die (which is a kind of inevitable damage) is 1 % per year. I think it makes sense to protect our life against artificial damages in such a way that the natural rate does not increase by more than, say, 1 %. That is, the artificial part of the yearly death rate should be smaller than 1% of 1%, i.e., 1:10000, increasing the natural death rate from 1% to 1.01%!
If we change from an individual to a nation as value to be protected, mainly the natural lifetime is different. If I suppose 10000 years as lifetime of a nation, in contrast to 100 years for an individual, and again assume that the artificial risks should at least be a factor of 100 below the natural one, the required security raises from 0.9999 to 0.999999 per year! Maybe, this is an explanation - not a justification - for the fact that individuals seem to be the big losers in a war between nations!
But the politician should not forget that he has it in his hands not only to improve protection. This can be very expensive. He may also manage that the probability of attacks is not increased by performing a dangerous politics which creates additional enemies and this way increases the threat potential.
If you are looking for examples, you may be tempted to consider the latest shocking terrorist attacks in Spain and UK. But do not forget that security is a statistical phenomenon which never should be assessed on the basis of only a few events!
The Biometric Society is not the only solution which fits to this description. Alternative systems using implanted ID chips will mainly do the same and deliver almost the same benefits.
In the following, the beneficial impacts on our life will be shown, regarding payment transactions, traveling by car, health care, communication, computing, entertainment, and law enforcement as important examples.
Obtaining services by fraud is made impossible because always a unique biometric recognition together with a creditworthiness inquiry is performed before granting the service.
As a result, no tickets for bus, train, or flights, nor tickets for football games, concerts, and gyms are needed any more.
This way, driving without permission, with stolen cars, or without sufficient creditworthiness is prevented from the very beginning. Only those types of cars can be driven for which an education has been performed.
The personal assignment of the universal street toll is managed automatically on the basis of the driver and car data.
After biometric identification, the patient may inspect his health records everywhere and anytime.
In the case of accidents, the rescue workers are able to inform about health data, blood type, immunizations, and allergies immediately. This is achieved with the aid of a mobile biometric identification on location and guarantees an optimum medical treatment.
In the case of fatality, the large expense of a manual identification is replaced by checking the biometric features.
In the Biometric Society, emails and phone calls are exclusively processed using biometric identification. This makes the user independent on any hardware. Nevertheless, stolen hardware can be identified by a unique device ID!
For addressing, only the data set of the biometric feature of the receiver is to be used. Names are not really necessary - they are merely needed for certain kind of direct inter-human communication.
Certainly, also every sender has to identify biometrically. This way, spamming and phishing is effectively prevented.
Biometrics ensures that only authorized persons are able to operate a computer and that all software can only be used with personal authorization.
Biometrics even allows for new license models. For example, if a certain person has licensed a software, this person is allowed to use this software anywhere on any running system. Since only authorized persons are allowed to use it, a software may be copied and installed arbitrarily often without any loss to the software developer.
Secure data access can be achieved in a similar way as all data is personalized using biometric identification. Personal Information Rights Management (PIRM) is used to prevent content piracy and to retain authors' rights.
Services like pay per view are managed by ordering a film using biometric identification. Like in computing, each data access is personalized while the data are free, may be copied as often as one wants, but remain inaccessible for the unauthorized. As a result, audio and video downloads need not necessarily be authorized by biometrics. Peer to peer (P2P) file sharing services are no problem for the content owners any more.
But how can I prevent unauthorized viewing and listening? Today, any transmission channel is secured using encryption techniques. Even the cable between receiver and monitor will be protected using HDMI (High Definition Multimedia Interface) [3]. However, this method does not prevent copying from screen, using an ordinary camera. So several companies even think about disturbing the display output in such a way that the camera record becomes unusable.
Maybe, the problem will solve quite naturally if 3D TV becomes more popular and will use goggles. This way viewing video will be personalized. If the method becomes common enough, it will be combined with biometric identification to prevent unauthorized use of the 3D video (and audio) data. Here, iris recognition is the preferred biometric feature which naturally integrates into the goggles.
Examples are prohibitions for shoplifters to enter a certain store, for hooligans to enter a football stadium, or refusal of border crossing for undesired aliens.
Since the network of biometric registration is densely tied, wanted criminals and terrorists may be localized immediately. This is accomplished by using the position data accumulated from shopping, traffic toll, mobile communication systems, and public transportation.
Obviously, this cannot be a solution against terrorism since only known terrorists are detected. Therefore, prevention will be used to solve the problem. Prevention can be realized using profiler agents which permanently investigate all data collected with respect to certain crime patterns or unknown anomalies. This is assumed to significantly reduce crime rate.
Mechanical copies of biometric features are the most critical challenges in our case. As countermeasure, a nearly perfect copy detection is essential.
Interestingly, with a perfect copy detection, publicity of a biometric feature is no problem any more – especially, there is no necessity to keep biometric templates secret!
The role of biometrics is only that of a unique identifier which enables easy database linking. This is a process which is mainly controlled by the operators of the identification application.
The real danger is the misuse of the identification application which collects and stores a lot of private information! For example, if the identification application is used to search for terrorist profiles, false assignments to innocents may be produced. And this issue may even question the whole application, respectively, the Biometric Society. This kind of risk cannot be solved technically.
The privacy matter is treated now, while focusing on giving up privacy with respect to the biometric identification system, its operators, and possible governmental users.
This poses the following questions:
As soon as something is technically realizable, there is a lot of demand to use these private data, especially for law enforcement, advertising, and criminal prevention.
Furthermore, it becomes extremely easy today to get the agreement for legal misappropriation of traffic data. There is little resistance from those who are affected. Commissioners for data protection have to do hard to stand up to government because their support from the public and media is surprisingly small.
Today, it cannot be predicted where the extension of surveillance stops. I guess this will be a one-way process which never ends and which will never reach total surveillance. The process can be compared with a mathematical series like 1, 2, 3, 4, ... which tends to infinity, but will never reach infinity.
Alternatively, an inversion of this trend seems only be possible after a restart following a political disaster like that one in Germany 70 years ago.
Slightly different is the situation where people are monitored preemptively against crime and terrorism. In this case, surveillance and tracing directly affects privacy and is naturally rejected by many citizens. The reason for a bad reputation is that surveillance is regarded as a means to keep totalitarianism alive by keeping down opposition. Is surveillance also a means to establish totalitarianism?
Totalitarianism has been shown to correlate strongly with "democide". H. J. Rummel, a professor emeritus of political science at the University of Hawaii, has shown that totalitarianism, in contrast to liberal democracy, is positively correlated with democide in a statistical sense [4]. The term "democide" he created to express "murder by government", as has been experienced, for example, under the dictatorship of Adolf Hitler. This enables two conclusions:
- totalitarianism is the cause for most democide, or
- democracy has no chance to establish in environments which favor democide.
For comparison, the estimated total number of deaths per year will be about 57 Mio. people in 2006 [11] which is about ten times as much as the smoking bar in the diagram.
Worldwide deaths
per year (recent or mean value)
For many people it may be surprising that not terrorism or natural disasters are the reason for the most artificial deaths. Even wars are small in effect compared to traffic, democide, or smoking victims. Although the data may not be very reliable, changes by even a factor of 10 will not principally change this image. Since there is no commonly agreed definition of terrorism, I made the worst case assumption of 10 000 deaths per year. But even this pessimistic number is not able to show a visible bar in the diagram!
Note the border line between the red and green background which is defined by 1% of the natural death rate I have used to define the required security. This required security separates between "secure" and "insecure".
I must confess, it was a surprise for me that for the chosen definition even the combined effect of wars, natural disasters, and terrorism does not qualify our world as an insecure world! And I have ceased to understand why terrorism shall really be a problem for this world while getting more and more concerned about certain reactions of democratic states.
For example, all German governments mainly acted for the German tobacco industry [10] when suing against the European tobacco product directive 2001/37/EC. In the meantime, other European countries like Ireland, Norway, Italy, Poland, and Spain felt responsible for their citizens and prohibited, for example, smoking in restaurants.
On the other hand, Germany was among the first to introduce the biometric passport with the justification to fight against terrorism, although most experts are convinced about the ineffectiveness in this regard.
And just the activities against terrorism often are suspected to help totalitarianism. Totalitarianism, however, is the medium for state terrorism and democide which is one of the real threats to humanity as shown in the diagram.
1. Without a nearly perfect fake detection, the normal operation of identification may suffer from fraud. Today, we are far away from a nearly perfect fake detection.
2. Not all people dispose of measurable biometric features anytime. This failure which is described by the Failure to Enroll Rate (FER) can never be zero. As a result, certain persons may be excluded from biometric identification and a fallback solution must be offered. This fallback solution may be utilized purposefully to escape the biometric identification.